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En Brasil, las políticas de accountability, llamadas políticas de responsabilización, se 
basan fundamentalmente en la atribución de incentivos salariales y otros pagos de 
bonificaciones a maestros y escuelas. Para muchos autores, la ecuación entre la 
accountability educativa y los bonos salariales ha reducido la discusión del significado 
y las consecuencias de la responsabilización a una valoración del simbolismo y las 
injusticias de los incentivos salariales. Por otro lado, el concepto de accountability en 
Brasil se ha asociado con una sola medida de control gubernamental y la más 
fácilmente asociada con la gestión de recursos humanos.Si se van a continuar los 
incentivos salariales, como una entre varias opciones de política, sus costos deben ser 
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calculados y comparados con los beneficios medidos por métodos apropiados de 
evaluación de políticas públicas. 
Palabras clave: Responsabilización, políticas de accountability, Incentivos salariales. 
ABSTRACT 
In Brazil, accountability policies, called políticas de responsabilização, are 
fundamentally based on the attribution of salary incentives and other bonus payments 
to teachers and schools. For many authors, the equation between educational 
accountability and salary bonuses has reduced the discussion of the meaning and 
consequences of the accountability to an appraisal of the symbolism and injustices of 
salary incentives. And the other hand, the concept of accountability in Brazil has 
become associated with a single measure of government control and the one most 
easily associated with human resource management. If salary incentives are to be 
continued, as one amongst a number of policy options, their costs need to be 
calculated and compared to the benefits as measured by appropriate methods of public 
policy evaluation. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In Brazil, authority for the supply and development of public basic education, 
from pre-school to the end of secondary, resides with state, Federal District and 
municipal governments, with the latter obliged to concentrate on pre-school and 
elementary schooling and the state governments on secondary education. The role of 
the federal government is to plan the national system, supply curriculum guidelines, 
offer financial and technical assistance and monitor results. This means that the 
overwhelming majority of public schools and teachers are under the charge of 
subnational educational authorities and that high-stakes accountability policies 
designed to influence school results, where they exist, are the purview of these same 
authorities.  
According to a recent count, since the year 2000 a total of 10 state 
governments in Brazil have implemented accountability policies in the form of salary 
incentives for members of school staff on the basis of school performance scores while 
a further three have deployed salary bonus policies using other criteria, including 
teacher assiduousness and participation in in-service training (Scorzafave, Ferreira and 
Dorrigan, 2015). The first state governments to use salary incentives based on external 
assessment measures of pupil performance, in policies designed to impact school 
results, were those of Rio de Janeiro and Ceará in the year 2000 and 2001 and the 
latest, the State of Tocantins, in 2012. The number of municipal governments to adopt 
similar incentive payments is unknown but the pioneer was the municipality of Sobral 
which, starting in 2001 (MEC/INEP, 2005), created a bonus scheme for teachers of 
reading and writing that later served as inspiration for the State government of Ceará.  
The operationalization of these salary incentives through one-off bonus 
payments, and the fact that the bonus payments are virtually the only form of high-
High-stakes accountability using teacher salary incentives in Brazil: An update 
  
 Profesorado, revista de currículum y formación del profesorado 20 (3) 210 
 
stakes accountability12 to take root in Brazil, has heavily influenced the broader debate 
on responsabilização, as educational accountability is known. For many authors, the 
equation between educational accountability and salary bonuses has reduced the 
discussion of the meaning and consequences of responsabilização to an appraisal of 
the symbolism and injustices of salary incentives. In the absence of local legislation 
such as the No Child Left Behind act with its variety of possible consequences, often 
negative, for annual school performance figures, the concept of accountability in Brazil 
has become associated with a single measure of government control and the one most 
easily associated with human resource management.    
The absence of a full range of accountability measures, and of a clear mandate 
for government to act on the behalf of citizens in the oversight of school results, have 
lead Brooke (2011) to affirm that the state salary incentive policies are first and 
foremost an employer´s strategy to increase school productivity. Indeed, with the lack 
of widespread publication of school level results and the absence of any consequences 
for those schools that miss out on the staff-wide bonus payments by failing to reach 
their goals, it can be questioned if the model of “responsabilização” as used by the 10 
states is really a version of educational accountability or not. While the bonus 
payments may serve the purpose of adding weight and focus to school level 
performance goals, the elements of accountability associated with transparency, the 
correct use of public funds and, above all, the achievement of a minimum levels of 
quality, are largely missing.  
                                                 
1 Understood as a type of accountability that over and above the symbolic effects of publicly relating school 
quality to pupil results can have important financial or career consequences for schools and those 
involved. 
2 Another form of high-stakes accountability, of smaller scope, is the distribution of state funds to municipal 
governments in the State of Ceará, and possibly other states, in accordance with a municipal education 
quality indicator based on pupil performance. Some forms of low-stakes accountability, including signs on 
the outside of schools publicizing the school´s overall quality score (IDEB), also exist.  
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The peculiarities of Brazilian educational accountability policies, their 
dissociation from questions of graduation rates, school-choice and standards, and their 
almost exclusive use as an instrument of public sector human resource management, 
has not protected them from high levels of criticism and grass-roots opposition from 
within the teacher unions. One of the purposes of the present article is to show that 
some of the criticism is inappropriate given the use of mainly US research carried out in 
a decidedly different cultural and educational context. In an attempt to make the 
discussion more relevant, the article will also look at recent research carried out in 
Brazil to determine whether the weight of the evidence supports the belief of 
educational administrators that bonus payments can promote gains in pupil 
performance without provoking damaging side-effects. The underlying goal of the 
article is to enable education policy-makers and managers to go beyond the ideological 
debate and take a dispassionate view regarding the benefits or otherwise of the model 
of salary incentive accountability currently in vogue in Brazil.  
 
2. ONSET OF EDUCATIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY 
Contrary to the chronology offered by some authors (Becker, 2014), the 
establishment of accountability policies in Brazil does not coincide with the start of 
external assessment at the beginning of the 90s. In the early phases of testing, starting 
with the federal government´s sample-based Basic Education Assessment System 
(SAEB) in 1990 and universal state-level assessment systems in the following years in 
such states as Minas Gerais, Ceará, Paraná and São Paulo, the responsible 
government departments expressed the purpose of testing in exclusively diagnostic 
terms. SAEB, for example, was designed to “understand patterns of student learning”, 
“promote discussion of curricular proposals”, “construct a solid data base on the public 
High-stakes accountability using teacher salary incentives in Brazil: An update 
  
 Profesorado, revista de currículum y formación del profesorado 20 (3) 212 
 
school teaching-learning process” (Maluf, 1996; Pilati, 1994). The state systems 
followed the same model, seeking, as in the case of Minas Gerais in 1992, to  
carry out diagnoses and create a data base comprising reliable information on 
state schools …with the purpose of designing a plan for the improvement of 
teaching capable of altering the current scenario of low productivity and high 
levels of grade repetition (Antunes, 1994).  
For this reason, the language of accountability was entirely absent from the 
early documents and the purpose of testing restricted to the use of performance data to 
understand the curricular difficulties of both teachers and pupils. If the authorities 
thought to use the results of the tests to guide management policy, this was restricted 
to the design of in-service training based on the teaching-learning difficulties identified 
by the tests. Indeed, there is evidence that the idea of attaching accountability type 
consequences to the results of the tests was actively spurned. In a statement at the 
time, the Secretary of Education of Minas Gerais recognised that teachers could not be 
blamed for the failure of pupils even if it were their responsibility to look for a solution to 
the problem (Mares Guia Neto, 1992). The education authorities of the time saw public 
education as a cooperative venture between government and teachers and while 
committed to the need to disseminate a “culture of assessment”, were wary of making 
comparisons and of attaching moral or material consequences to the results of the 
tests (Brooke, 2006). 
The first phase of test expansion in Brazil is therefore dissimilar to the 
expansion of state-level testing that took place in the United States in the mid-1970s.  
In that country, state-level authorities reacted to the widely discussed evidence that 
public schooling was in decline by adopting so-called minimum competency tests 
designed to assess students´ basic skills at elementary and secondary levels. Between 
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1975 and 1978, 33 states had already mandated the setting of minimum competency 
standards and the remaining states had some form of legislation under study (PIPHO, 
1978).  Simultaneously, a number of states fixed standards that defined the minimum 
test scores necessary for high school graduation, thereby making schools responsible 
for their students’ progress beyond high school. With the expansion of testing in the 
following decade, provoked largely by the report A Nation at Risk and its emphasis on 
higher expectations and standards for high school graduates, course graduation 
requirements were tightened, further raising the stakes attached to high school test 
results (Dee, 2003). By the time the next phase of test driven reforms came into play, 
prompted by accountability initiatives in Texas and North Carolina in the 1990s and the 
ensuing No Child Left Behind (NCLB) legislation in 2002, the association between 
testing and high stakes accountability was already well established (West and 
Peterson, 2003). As far as teachers were concerned, testing by the state government 
had long been associated with performance standards and the way parents and 
authorities judged the work of schools.  
The first salary incentive policies in Brazil, supported by a still incipient 
accountability discourse, took a decade to materialize.  It seems likely that some of the 
thinking was supplied by the NCLB model. However, the use of pupil scores as at least 
one of the criteria for bonus payments in the States of Rio de Janeiro and Ceará was 
also the product of greater confidence in the reliability of the state testing systems and 
the ability to compare results over time.  These technical advances had been achieved 
by the incorporation of Item Response Theory into the test construction process and 
the creation and interpretation of proficiency scales for Portuguese and Maths. 
Following the lead of the SAEB tests, that undertook its own technical overhaul in 
1995, the state testing systems began to adopt TRI technology and incorporate the 
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national proficiency scales in 2000, starting with the Minas Gerais system of 
educational assessment.  
Taking the first examples of salary incentives as indicative of government 
thinking, it is clear that the association between pupil results and bonus payments was 
part of a policy designed to improve school management and efficiency. In the case of 
the New School program in the State of Rio de Janeiro, for example, the point system, 
that determined whether the school had either a satisfactory overall evaluation or had 
“progressed” enough from one year to the next to merit the staff-wide bonus payment, 
took into consideration a number of school governance indicators as well as the 
measures of school efficiency (retention rates) and school academic performance. In 
the 2004 version of the policy, the school management indicators included the correct 
presentation of school accounts, staff assiduity, integration with the community and 
enrolment management (Rio de Janeiro, 2004a; 2004b). There being no externally 
provided parameters or standards to determine the satisfactoriness of school 
performance, schools were grouped according to average pupil socioeconomic status 
and compared with each other to determine which had progressed most. By creating a 
bonus scheme that offered all members of staff the chance to benefit from improved 
school management and results, the authorities laid bare their beliefs regarding the 
possible reasons for poor school performance and the benefits of promoting 
collaboration between members of school staff.  
The general question of government efficiency and performance had grown as 
a political objective with the adoption of a Brazilian version of government reform, 
loosely modelled on the UK´s New Public Management model (Abrucio, 2006), and the 
end of inflation due to the introduction of the new currency, the Real. With the 1995 
financial crisis, the privatization of state banks, the need to renegotiate state debt and a 
number of other regulations to control subnational finances, the State governments 
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were forced to abandon the predatory financial practices that had used inflation as a 
way to solve the fiscal deficit and seek new means to increase efficiency (ABRUCIO; 
GAETANI, 2006). At the same time, the idea of strategic government planning and the 
use of indicators gained momentum with the launch of two Federal Government 
initiatives: the 1997 Study of National Integration and Development and the 2000-2003 
Multi-Year Plan, called Advance Brazil, which referenced all government programs in 
terms of objectives, target populations, goals, indicators and standards and procedures 
for the evaluation of quantifiable results (Muniz, Silveira and Bechelaine, 2010).  
In the case of Ceará, the program to pay bonuses to teachers was much 
simpler. In a straightforward ranking of schools, that eschewed any attempt to take 
pupil socioeconomic characteristics into consideration, the New Millennium Educational 
Prize offered payment of an annual bonus to all staff members of the top 100 schools 
according to average performance in 4th and 8th grade Portuguese and Maths. For the 
top 50 schools the prize was 100% of the specified value while for the next 50 the prize 
was worth half this value. For the top scoring pupils there were also prizes. The 
purpose of the program was to promote public recognition for higher performing 
schools, to improve the school environment by creating a “climate of quality” in order to 
influence school results and to raise the standards of public education (Law 13.203 of 
February 21, 2002). While avoiding the use of the word accountability or its Portuguese 
equivalent, the authorities repeatedly expressed the belief that education professionals 
can cooperate at school level to improve collective results. The Ceará incentive 
program has undergone numerous modifications over the years and remains the only 
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3. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS  
More recent state-level salary incentive programs have sought to avoid some of 
the pitfalls of their predecessors. For example, the new São Paulo program3, 
introduced in 2008, gets round the problem of a lack of standards by relating bonus 
program payments to the degree to which the school has achieved its targets. The 
setting of school level performance targets is based on a composite indicator of school 
quality comprised of both pupil survival rates and performance averages, called IDESP. 
To create a relationship between the bonus payment and the degree to which the 
IDESP targets are met, the Secretariat of Education has created an index based on the 
degree of target achievement for each cycle at each school (Ferraz, 2009). In schools 
that have an achievement rate of 100% of the target, for example, all teachers and 
school staff receive a bonus equivalent to 20% of their annual salary, making the bonus 
scheme very much like a private sector performance pay policy. However, given the 
other goal of the accountability system, to reduce absenteeism, all individual payments 
depend on employee assiduousness. To receive the bonus, employees must have 
worked at least two thirds of school days over the previous year. 
To avoid the risk of teachers concentrating on pupils most likely to show 
improvement on test results, thereby giving less attention to those at the higher and 
lower extremes of attainment, the program has innovated by creating four levels of 
pupil performance, going from Below Basic to Advanced, and calculating the proportion 
of pupils at each level. In this way it is possible to frame the performance component of 
the composite IDESP index in terms of the discrepancy between the measured position 
of the pupils and the ideal of having every pupil at the advanced level (Soares, 2009). 
The use of this discrepancy indicator as the measure of school performance signals the 
                                                 
3 A previous bonus program, introduced in 2001, was based on average staff assiduousness and average 
pupil performance as measured by the state assessment system – SARESP (BROOKE, 2008).  
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desirability of improving the scores of the lower performing students, thereby favouring 
greater equality of results.  
The bonus program of the State of Espirito Santo, introduced in 2010, is also 
based on a locally generated indicator of school quality. In this case, however, the 
Indicator of School Development is a function of both school results and school effort. 
The logic of the effort component is that the higher the socioeconomic level of students 
the lower the school's efforts to produce good results. The component uses a 
calculation of the difference between the socioeconomic level of the school, on a scale 
from 0 to 5, and a maximum value arbitrated at 10. The school with the highest 
socioeconomic level will have an effort index of 5, while the school with the lowest 
socioeconomic status will have an index of 10. Using the same logic in relation to the 
different education levels offered by the school, and assuming an increase in the effort 
with the advance of the student through the first grades of elementary school to high 
school, total school effort is estimated in accordance with the composition of the body 
student by educational level. In this way, the School Effort Indicator is found to take into 
account both the socioeconomic level of the school and the diversity of educational 
levels and to allow comparisons between schools that are not vitiated by differences in 
student background and conditions. 
Further innovations include the creation of an additional level of pupil 
performance entitled “The Excluded”, given zero weighting, comprising all pupils who 
drop out or who fail to appear for the end of year assessments. Overall, the 
performance levels send out the same message as in São Paulo, benefiting the school 
that manages to promote its students to higher levels while reinforcing school efforts to 
avoid dropout and discourage the “hiding” of lower performing students before the 
tests.  
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The Minas Gerais bonus program is somewhat different from the São 
Paulo/Espirito Santo model. Called the Results Agreement, the methodology 
implemented in 2008 and repeated annually since then4 extends to all government 
departments. In the case of the Secretariat of Education, the agreement relates to the 
results of the central Secretariat, the regional educational superintendents (SREs) and 
all schools. For a particular school, the final performance score is a composite, deriving 
65% from the Secretariat´s score, 10% from the local SRE scores and 25% from the 
school´s own “results indicators”. This composition clearly shows that the responsibility 
for the school´s final score is shared between the three administrative levels and 
mitigates somewhat the criticism that accountability unilaterally shifts responsibility onto 
the shoulders of teachers. 
The school´s results indicators relate to a set of 10 targets, typically expressed 
in terms of average student proficiency per subject and year. As an example, the sixth 
target, weighing 2.14% of the total school note, concerns average 9th grade student 
proficiency in Portuguese. The school gets top marks if the observed value for the 
target is greater than or equal to the recommended level for the year, in accordance 
with the classification system published by the State´s assessment system. If the 
school result is lower than the recommended level, an equation is used to calculate the 
difference between the proficiency achieved and the target. The percentage of the 
productivity award to which the school is entitled is given by the addition of its own 
indicators to those of the Secretariat and the regional office. This maths is intended as 
a way to ensure that the school receives some benefit even if it fails to reach 100% of 
the targets.  
One of the interesting aspects of the Results Agreement is the process for 
setting targets. This process culminates in the signing of a term of commitment on the 
                                                 
4 Discontinued in 2015. 
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part of SREs and schools after a period in which the targets are listed school by school 
on the internet. If the school does not agree with its targets, there is a procedure for the 
suggestion and evaluation of new goals. Although a centralized process, the possibility 
of school counterproposals gives legitimacy to the targets and justifies the signature of 
the term of commitment. Not that the Secretariat abides by all the counterproposals: of 
3,988 schools in 2010, 10% sought to change their goal, and of these, only 10% 
succeeded (Brooke, 2011).  
State-level accountability programs were given new impetus by the creation of a 
composite ‘indicator of basic education development’ (IDEB) by the federal government 
in 2007.  By creating a single indicator of both pupil performance and pupil flow, the 
Ministry of Education made it possible to express the quality of the school on a scale 
from 1 to 10 and for the first time establish a national discussion on the direction and 
speed of educational improvement. More importantly, by combining the results of the 
biennial Prova Brasil tests of 5th and 9th grade Maths and Portuguese, launched in 
2005, with average rates of grade completion using data from the annual education 
census, and then calculating the necessary growth in school performance in order to 
reach the target of average OECD performance by the year 2021, the Ministry created 
what has become the main instrument of educational monitoring and management for 
both municipal and state governments (Vidal and Vieira, 2011). 
At the time the IDEB was launched, the head of the Ministry´s educational 
assessment institute had no doubts as to its potential as an instrument of 
accountability. In an article two years later, he explained: 
When analysing the potential and risks of an educational accountability 
program, we concluded that such programs can help raise student 
achievement, but are not without risks. In Brazil, the main risk with an 
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accountability system focusing only on student performance in external 
examinations is to aggravate the grade repetition and dropout problems. That 
was the main reason for creating the IDEB. By combining the Prova Brazil 
scores with approval rates, the IDEB aims to curb both the indiscriminate failing 
of students and the practice of passing students who have learned nothing. The 
IDEB was also used to set targets for schools and school systems and thus 
provoke the greater commitment of state education departments and 
municipalities so that, by 2021, Brazil can reach the current educational stage of 
developed countries. As long as there is dissemination of results and target- 
setting for schools, the emphasis of the accountability system will belong to the 
states and municipalities (Fernandes and Gremaud, 2009. p.238) 
The only deficiency of the Ministry´s system of targets is that it depends on the 
Prova Brasil whose biennial frequency is less than ideal for education authorities 
seeking a more rigorous monitoring based on annual targets. Local authorities also 
emphasise the need for control over the production and dissemination of school results 
to ensure deadlines and continuity. No surprise, therefore, that many States with their 
own assessment systems, like São Paulo, Espirito Santo, Amazonas, Rio de Janeiro 
and Pernambuco, have created their own purpose-built state-level indicators of basic 
education quality rather than adopt IDEB. Other states, Paraiba, Tocantins and 
Sergipe, have chosen not to establish their own assessment systems and are currently 
using either Prova Brasil results or the IDEB indicator as the principal criterion of 
school performance and the payment of salary incentives. 
 
4. OPPOSITION 
Given that Brazil has 26 states and one Federal District, the fact that only 10 
states have created salary bonus accountability programs, 7 on the basis of their own 
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assessment systems and 3 on the basis of biennial federal government data on school 
performance, indicates that the policy is considerably less than unanimous (Scorzafave 
and Dorigan, 2015). There is no equivalent data for the municipalities but it is telling 
that of the six state capitals with proprietary assessment systems, only one, Rio de 
Janeiro, has instituted bonus payments for teachers. There is evidence that some 
authorities created plans to establish accountability policies that were then abandoned 
for political reasons. This was the case of the Federal District in 2011 and the state 
capitals of both Belo Horizonte and São Paulo. The demise of the first salary incentive 
policy in Rio Janeiro, the Nova Escola program, brought to an end by the state 
governor elected in 2006 on a campaign promise to the teachers’ union to do away 
with the policy, is also documented (Brooke, 2008). 
The strength of opposition to the policy varies from state to state, depending on 
the nature of the relationship between the state government and the local public 
teachers’ union but in no case have teachers declared support for the policy. The 
overwhelming opinion in academic circles is also contrary to the use of salary 
incentives. The arguments against the policy were laid out in systematic form at the 
33rd meeting of the National Association of Postgraduate Studies and Research in 
Education (ANPED) in 2010 when faculty and students met to create the Movement 
Against High-Stakes Testing in Education (MOVIMENTO, 2010). The same concerns 
were also aired in a National Education Council document concerning basic education 
evaluation (CNE, 2012). Among the document´s conclusions are the need to avoid 
high-stakes tests, because of their potential to “corrupt education quality indicators and 
generate fraud” (p.24), and to shun pupil results as the basis for the calculation of 
salary incentives because of the lack of empirical evidence as to the possible 
consequences of such a policy. A special edition of the Education and Society journal 
in 2012 on Public Education Accountability Policies also serves as a source for the 
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arguments against high-stakes accountability based on salary incentives (FREITAS, 
2012).   
The arguments against the policy can be roughly divided into two categories 
(Brooke, 2013b; Furtado and Magrone, 2015). The larger of the two contains the 
reflections of those who reject accountability for doctrinaire reasons, often based on 
beliefs regarding the structural determinants of accountability, as demonstrated by 
developments in the United States.  In this view, Brazil is just the latest to succumb to 
changes in the role of the State, the move towards privatization and the expansion of 
external assessment to better adapt schooling to the demands of capitalist production 
(Freitas, 2012).  Accountability, in this perspective, is part of the strategy to advance 
the privatization of public education through the advance of meritocracy as a 
philosophical and organizational ideal.  
Further doctrinaire arguments include the rejection of accountability not 
primarily for its connection with capitalist development but for the impropriety of neo-
liberal models of educational management adopted over the last decades by 
conservative governments. In this view, the problem of accountability resides in its 
authoritarian, private sector origins that denote a competitive, market-oriented 
philosophy entirely inappropriate for the public sector and alien to the ideals of an 
education system premised on democratic freedoms. The key words of the criticism are 
conservatism and managerialism, both used to describe a method of undemocratic 
school control based on the production of academic results, as measured by tests, that 
leaves out the “political quality” of education in terms of the teaching and exercise of 
citizenship (DEMO, 1998) and substitutes concerns for equity and equality with those 
of control (Gentili and Silva, 1995). In these terms, high-stakes accountability distorts 
the true purpose of education by constraining teachers and creating inappropriate 
goals. 
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These criticisms are not easily countered. Their authors are unlikely to be 
convinced of the possibility of gains for the Brazilian education system as the result of 
the borrowing and use of neo-liberal methods. This difficulty is revealed by the refusal 
even to see the relevance of such concepts as efficiency and efficacy in school 
management because of their prior association with Taylorism (Lima and Afonso, 
2002). Arguments citing the advances in education access and better test results as 
indicative of democratization and the improvement of education quality would not be 
accepted as evidence of the advantages of neo-liberal thinking as these gains are 
exclusively individual. As such they do not capture the collective, societal impact of 
education nor include school processes as part of the definition of quality (Ximenes, 
2012). 
The difficulty of establishing a dialogue between those responsible for the 
framing and implementation of accountability policy and those who reject neo-liberal 
philosophy and methods on principle, does not mean that the only problem of salary 
bonus accountability is a question of ideology.  There is a considerable amount of 
evidence that the policy is prone to numerous other problems, both regarding the 
outcomes desired by its proponents and the undesired side-effects it is able to provoke. 
However, it is only worth studying these practical questions of public policy if we are 
allowed to suspend ideological judgement and assess the policy in the same terms in 
which it is framed by state and municipal governments. Given the purpose of the article 
to inform public sector education administrators, we need to admit the legitimacy of 
accountability as an instrument of educational management, albeit unproven, and 
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5. INEQUALITY 
Practical considerations regarding the undesirable side-effects of salary 
incentive accountability fall into the second category of arguments used to combat the 
policy. Of these, the most urgent, given Brazil´s struggle to reduce regional and social 
differences in pupil performance levels, is that salary incentives lead to an increase in 
inequality. In newspaper articles published in 2010 and 2012, Maria Alice Setubal, 
President of the Centre for Studies and Research in Education, Culture and 
Community Action (Cenpec), raised the thesis that the payment of bonuses could 
create an unhealthy competition between schools and cause even greater inequalities. 
The reasoning was that the teachers with permanent civil servant status and freer, 
therefore, to choose their place of work, would seek schools with better results to 
increase their chances of receiving the bonus. These schools are likely to be centrally 
located, with students of higher sociocultural level. Consequently, schools located in 
the urban periphery, with highly vulnerable clienteles, would be left to the temporary 
contract teachers, with less experience and probably less expertise.  
Although Setubal failed to produce evidence based on research, a recent focus 
group study in Rio de Janeiro has shown that at least in some cases teachers have 
been known to migrate to schools that have reached their targets and received bonus 
payments in precisely the way predicted by Setubal (Cerdeiran and Almeida, 2013). 
The research does not indicate, however, if the movement of teachers could 
exacerbate inequality as it simultaneously suggests that the schools with greatest 
difficulty in reaching their targets are precisely those with higher levels of performance.   
A further criticism, raised by Freitas (2012), cites research on the Chicago 
school system taken to show that academically disadvantaged students were left 
behind because the NCLB proficiency counts did not provide incentives for schools to 
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direct more attention towards them (Neal and Schanzenbach, 2010). Because these 
US results also showed significant increases in achievement for students near the 
proficiency standard, the results were taken as confirmation of the tendency of 
teachers to concentrate their efforts on students who are near the average so as to 
maximize the proportion of students who pass. This tendency, if real, can obviously 
harm students of lower performance levels and lead to increasing inequality. To the 
extent that the worst performers tend to be of lower socioeconomic level, this strategy 
of concentrating effort on average performance students can lead to socioeconomic 
segregation within the school. 
However, both Setubal and Freitas may have overgeneralized by extending 
their criticism to all models of salary incentives. In the case of Setubal, concerned with 
between school inequality, the model of salary incentives under observation was that of 
São Paulo which at the time had yet to make any allowance for differences in pupil 
SES levels in the fixing of targets and the calculation of bonus payments. In other 
states, including Espirito Santo and Rio de Janeiro, this criterion had already been 
adopted, thereby eliminating the advantage of teachers moving to a higher SES school. 
As Brooke (2013a) suggests, the Espirito Santo model of “school effort” could perfectly 
well be extended to include such factors as teacher/pupil ratios, school location, school 
violence etc. and thereby incorporate an “affirmative action” component to attract 
higher qualified teachers to poorer neighbourhoods.  
In the case of Freitas, concerned with within school inequality, the model was 
the criterion of Average Yearly Progress (AYP) based on pass rates, as per NCLB 
guidelines. None of the Brazilian states use a pass rate based on standards as the 
criterion for their incentive policies. On the other hand, five states use criteria that could 
be construed as similar to AYP, including Ceará, and Amazonas which employ average 
school performance levels as measured by their own assessment systems, and 
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Tocantins, Sergipe and Paraiba which determine salary incentives on the basis of the 
school average indicators supplied by the ministry. The other states with their own 
assessment systems have incorporated the idea of school targets that, in increasing 
number, take into consideration the proportion of students at each level of 
performance, precisely as a way to combat any tendency of teachers to concentrate 
their efforts on pupils near the average and neglect students of lower levels of 
attainment. Therefore, in the case of within school inequality, it would seem that the 
criticism is pertinent for one particular model of salary incentive accountability but does 
not indicate an inherent defect of all policies. In Brazil, these policies vary according to 
type, methodology, periodicity, coverage, bonus and other criteria. The degree to which 
the chosen policy is able to promote equality between and within schools, and counter 
the other undesirable side-effects still to be discussed, could be taken as a measure of 
its quality, which would then suggest that the overall problem of salary incentive 
accountability is one of appropriate design rather than of fatal flaws.  
Notwithstanding, recent research in Brazil raises questions regarding the thesis 
that the impact on equality depends on whether the policy is designed for this purpose 
or not. In a national study of urban 5th and 9th grade pupils, the authors used the Prova 
Brasil results from 2007, 2009 and 2011 to compare the average performance of all 
states divided into three categories: those without any bonus scheme since 2007; 
those with bonus schemes that in their design seek to reduce inequality by creating 
targets for different levels of performance; and those with bonus schemes that do not 
seek to reduce inequality (Scorzafave and Dorigan, 2015). Different measures of 
system equality were employed, including the standard deviation for pupil scores and 
the Gini coefficient, in a model designed to relate change in system inequality to a 
range of factors including the type of bonus. Unexpectedly, findings show that states 
with policies designed to reduce inequality showed an increase in the inequality of 
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results between 2007 and 2011 when compared to others.  However, as the 
researchers were unable to track the effects of the bonus policies for more than one or 
two years, given that many were introduced in 2009 or later, it is possible that the 
impact had still to appear. This seems likely given that the state systems with the 
highest levels of inequality were precisely those that implemented bonus schemes 
designed to reduce inequality. More important for the appreciation of the research, 
however, is the fact that the type of inequality that the bonus schemes seek to attack 
by promoting improvement at all levels of pupil performance is the within-school variety 
while the inequality measured by the researchers is the range of results across the 
system. If the research were to be repeated using the standard deviation of within 
school scores it would be possible to offer an answer on this crucial question.  
A further source of inequality, that could possibly be related to the existence of 
salary incentives, is the informal, unseen selection of students by school directors. 
Although illegal, given that schools have mandatory catchment areas and are obliged 
to enrol all pupils on a first come first served basis, researchers in São Paulo and Rio 
de Janeiro see the operation of a hidden quasi-market, in which some schools seek to 
encourage or discourage pupils from enrolling in accordance with their area or 
residence, colour or socioeconomic status, leading to informal patterns of school 
specialization (Érnica and Batista, 2011; Costa and Koslinski, 2011).  Although still not 
clear whether the preference for higher performing pupils is due to the incentive policy, 
to broader definitions of school prestige and quality held by parents and/or staff or just 
the demands by teachers to reduce pupil heterogeneity, the work of Cerdeira and 
Almeida confirms that there are indeed some school principals in in Rio “who do not 
accept low performing pupils” (Cerdeiran and Almeida, 2013. p.9).  
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6. CURRICULUM 
The most common criticisms regarding the side-effects of Brazil´s high-stakes 
accountability policies concern their undesirable impacts on the curriculum. The types 
of curriculum impact can be classified as a. the definition of school purpose, b. the 
curriculum that is effectively taught and c. the style of teaching. 
a) It is held that the payment of salary incentives contingent on external 
assessments can lead not only to a reduction in the diversity of school activities 
but also the suppression of social, cultural and political objectives that contribute 
to the integral development of the pupils (XIMENES, 2012). In other words, high-
stakes accountability in Brazil can reduce the purpose of schooling to a small 
number of largely academic goals due to the importance of good test results to 
the chances of receiving a salary bonus.  
b) The consequences of high-stakes testing on the choice of specific academic 
contents is also seem as a problem, commonly referred to as curriculum 
narrowing, when schools and teachers focus their resources on the teaching of 
the subject areas which are covered by the tests while other subjects get 
insufficient attention or are eliminated. As Freitas (2012) states: 
When the tests include certain disciplines and leave others out, teachers tend to 
teach the subjects addressed in the tests [..] Assessments generate traditions. 
They direct the attention of teachers, administrators and students. If what is 
valued in a test are reading and mathematics, then special attention will be 
devoted to these, leaving other formative aspects out [..]. (Freitas, 2012. p.389) 
c) In a further criticism, it is held that “teaching to the test” becomes more of a 
problem given the increased importance of test results. The choice of subject 
content according to the probability of its inclusion in the tests and the 
High-stakes accountability using teacher salary incentives in Brazil: An update 
  
 Profesorado, revista de currículum y formación del profesorado 20 (3) 229 
 
exaggerated use of test preparation are seen as typical of this style of teaching, 
more concerned with test results than the permanent acquisition of abilities. 
In the absence of a solid body of local research on the impact of salary 
incentives on the way schools and teachers define their objectives and organize their 
practice, most critics rely on evidence from the United States. For this purpose, there is 
a vast array of research, some of it summarized by Pedulla (2003), Madaus, Russell 
and Higgins, (2009) and Newberg-Long (2010). By and large, this literature confirms 
the existence of curriculum narrowing and relates this phenomenon to the growth in 
test-based reform and high-stakes testing in that country. 
The assumption of many of those who transpose the findings of US research to 
the Brazilian context is that as high-stakes accountability affecting teachers is largely a 
US invention then all we need to determine this policy´s local impact is to study its 
history in its country of origin. However, as is well-documented, in the dynamics of 
policy borrowing the original proposal is subjected to a process of internalization and 
‘indigenization’ that can lead to policy formats that are entirely new (Steiner-Khamsi, 
2012). The political pressures to which the policy is subjected, as the result of the local 
cultural and educational environment, requires the use of the local policy context as the 
analytical unit.   
One of the relevant differences between the two countries regarding the forms 
and consequences of accountability is related to the culture of government employment 
and the legislation governing public teacher careers. In Brazil, teaching jobs are 
acquired through public exams, promotions awarded on the basis of academic 
qualifications or years of service and teachers protected from being evaluated, 
transferred or losing their jobs in an environment that is free of risk of school 
intervention and closure. This scenario makes it impossible for the authorities to relate 
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teacher career movements to any measure of teacher performance, including pupil 
results, or to suggest any type of negative consequence for teachers or schools that fail 
to reach their targets. This would explain why the only type of high stakes 
accountability in use in Brazil is a collective award given to the school, rather than the 
individual, and expressly excludes any threat of loss of pupils, diminished funding, 
school intervention, school closure or loss of career opportunities, as in the US.  As the 
Secretariat of Education of Rio de Janeiro states on its web page: 
Meritocracy is … above all, the appreciation of the most competent. The… 
appreciation of the good professional. It also includes the appreciation of 
professionals in schools that present the best performance. And in this case all 
professionals in the school unit receive a bonus. There is no punishment. Only 
the reward. What is more, there is no individual bonus payment. The winner is 
the school team. All for the sake of teamwork. Everyone wins at the school: 
teacher, director, kitchen staff, guard. The goal is not individual; it is the school 
unit. There is no punishment, even if the school does not reach its goal 
(Seeduc, 2016). 
The absence of any negative consequences and the fact that the salary 
incentives are the only example of accountability in those states to have implemented 
the policy, makes for a fairly mild accountability climate.  This in contrast to the US 
situation in which different types of accountability coexist and are compounded in what 
might be described as a more saturated accountability environment. Marsh et al (2011) 
allude to this type of environment when ascribing the lack of results for the bonus 
scheme for teachers in the city of New York to what they call “other accountability 
pressures”. For these researchers, the lack of clear correlation between the bonuses 
received by teachers and student outcomes can be attributed, at least in part, to the 
numerous other high-stakes consequences linked to student results of greater 
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significance to teachers, including the NCLB goals, parental demands and the city´s 
own teacher assessment and promotion policies. This would make for the considerably 
more anxiety producing accountability environment described by Ravitch (2010). The 
way in which the bonus policy is received and impacts teacher behaviour could 
therefore be more a function of local conditions, including the co-existence with 
different types and levels of accountability, than of the nature of the policy itself. 
Brazilian research on curriculum narrowing has been slow to get off the ground 
even in states such as Ceará with more than 15 years of experience of teacher salary 
incentives. Indeed, the lack of academic production in that State might even be taken 
as an indication that curriculum narrowing is not the burning issue the critics suggest. 
In Minas Gerais, one piece of research has broached the issue using a number of the 
same questions used by the team of Boston College researchers who in 2003 carried 
out a national survey of teachers in the United States to determine the perceived 
effects of state-mandated testing programs on teaching and learning (Pedulla et al, 
2003). In the Minas Gerais version of this research, relevant to the present discussion 
because of the salary incentive program in this State, the questionnaire was answered 
by 978 school principals from all regions and with more than three years of job 
experience (Borges, 2016).  
The responses of 80% of the school principals indicate that the external 
assessments to which the school is subjected have led to greater articulation in the 
management of the curriculum between teachers and between the different phases of 
basic education. But this articulation has not been achieved as the result of a slavish 
attention to the details of the tests. Only 15% responded that they recommend their 
Portuguese and Maths teachers to follow the test matrices when doing their planning 
and only 20% admit to a reduction in the time dedicated to artistic or cultural activities 
as the result of the external assessments. When asked the direct question as to 
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whether the pressure to obtain good results leads teachers to narrow the curriculum, 
only 17% agreed. 
One reason for school principals to believe that the tests themselves have had 
little effect on the choice of subject matter is the high level of alignment between the 
tests and the official curriculum as described in detail on the Secretariat of Education´s 
website and in the material distributed to teachers. This material, called the Common 
Basic Contents, act as common core standards and are followed by teachers according 
to 94% of school principals.  
The high degree of observance of the common core raises the question as to 
whether the narrowing to which the critics refer is more the product of official decisions 
regarding the curriculum, reflecting the desire of the authorities to focus attention on 
certain contents rather than others. This, however, would be a separate discussion, 
related to the perceived need to guarantee that all students acquire the basic skills 
related to Portuguese and Maths in the lower years, and Maths, Portuguese and 
Science in the final years of primary and secondary schooling. In this case, the 
authorities are using the official curriculum and its related tests to signal priorities. If the 
salary bonus contributes to this end, it would be favouring compliance with official 
curriculum policy rather than distorting or narrowing it. 
On the positive side, between 76% and 88% of school principals in Minas 
Gerais feel that external assessments have promoted greater attention to teaching-
learning objectives, have increased the rigor of teachers in the design of their own 
assessments, have increased the monitoring and oversight of teaching, have increased 
the accompaniment of pupils and the adoption of strategies to increase school success 
and have led teachers to be more attentive in adapting their practice to the needs of 
the pupils. While only 14% feel that the pupils are under intense pressure to improve 
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their test results and only 13% that teachers are pressured to give less attention to 
pupils with learning difficulties, 79% see external assessments as a good strategy to 
measure what pupils learn and 84% that they have led to greater exchange of 
knowledge and pedagogical experience between teachers.  
In other states with salary incentives, research suggests that while the practice 
of school principals has changed little, the bonus policy has increased the level of 
interest regarding school targets (Medeiros, 2014). In Rio de Janeiro, for example: 
.. It was noticed that the bonus policy implemented by SEEDUC/RJ did not 
cause major changes in the management practices of state schools in the 
Valencia municipality. It only generated greater concern regarding the 
achievement of school goals. As a result, school managers began to focus 
more on making parents, students and teachers more aware of the importance 
of achieving the goals rather than on appropriating the results of evaluations to 
improve learning (Medeiros, 2014. p.87). 
While the lack of concern with the use of test results for the purpose of guiding 
future teaching-learning is worrisome, the conclusion that the bonus policy has 
increased attention to school goals would be deemed proof of its success by the Rio de 
Janeiro education authorities. The assumption behind the policy, especially when 
based on school-level performance targets, is to give significance to the targets and 
thereby encourage teachers and others to seek gains in pupil performance. If this can 
be achieved without any apparent disruption to teaching or management, the policy 
can be seen as contributing to the improvement of education quality. 
Other research in Rio de Janeiro, already mentioned in relation to the question 
of inequality, also describes the contradictory opinions of teachers and school 
principals for and against external evaluation (Cerdeira and Almeida, 2013). It is telling, 
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however, that the authors believe school principals and teachers to be living a “process 
of legitimation” of IDEB and other performance indicators as a consequence of the 
ability of these to express the reality of the schools. By and large, the authors believe 
the “resistance of teachers to be lessening in tandem with the visible improvement in 
school results” (p.13). School principals agree that is was necessary to implement 
external assessment and the bonus policy in order for teachers to demonstrate greater 
effort, that the external assessments have brought more dedication and collective effort 
and that the impact on the curriculum has been positive.  
Although it is still early days for Brazilian research into the curricular 
consequences of high-stakes assessment, some articles have attempted to summarize 
the situation. One such article, by Bonamino and Sousa (2012), concentrates on the 
States of São Paulo and Pernambuco.  The first observation concerns the efforts of 
these states to improve the school-level appropriation of external assessment results 
by establishing an official “unified” curriculum and corresponding curriculum materials. 
Even if the natural order of events would have put the assessment system as a 
successor to the definition of curriculum guidelines rather than its predecessor, the 
alignment of curriculum and testing is to be applauded. And although it is unclear to 
what degree this alignment can be attributed to the bonus payment policies, it can be 
presumed that, in the absence of clear curricular guidelines, a bonus policy based on 
school-level performance targets would represent an even greater challenge to 
teachers. 
The second observation is that the assessment systems have gradually 
adopted the role of orienting the way teachers plan and teach their classes, especially 
in the way they evaluate their students. According to Bonamino and Sousa (2012) this 
indicates the appropriation of the methods of external assessment through an 
emphasis on the application of different types of tests, including mock exams. The 
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authors agree that it is early days yet but believe that the assessments might be 
“exacerbating the concern of school principals and teachers to prepare their pupils for 
the tests” (p.396). On the other hand, it is taken as proven that high stakes testing has 
led to a more informed discussion on the school curriculum in terms of the basic skills 
in reading and Maths that need to be guaranteed for all pupils (Bonamino and Sousa, 
2012). The ambiguity of this conclusion is due to the fact that the concern with testing, 
and even the signs of “teaching to the test”, can, under certain circumstances, be an 
indication that teachers who were without guidelines have now adopted a way to 
improve their teaching.  
 
7. EFFICACY 
The most scathing of the criticisms levelled at the salary incentive policy is that 
it doesn´t work. This would mean that despite the organizational effort and expense, 
the gains in pupil performance taken to be the measure of policy impact, are either 
non-existent or insufficient to justify the investment. Given this lack of proof of the 
policy´s efficacy, one author has not only decried the waste of resources but accused 
education administrators of a lack of ethics for subjecting schools to untried remedies 
(Freitas, 2012, 2013).  
Looking at US research, the results are wildly contradictory, due to the variety of 
contexts, policy formats, research designs, researcher biases and other factors. This 
creates the need for an independent meta-analysis, happily met by the 2011 report on 
research carried out in the US and elsewhere by the National Research Council 
Committee on Incentives and Test-Based Accountability in Public Education published 
by the National Academies Press (Hout and Elliott, 2011). After applying strict criteria 
for the selection of the best research methodologies, the National Research Council 
study looks closely at just 11 experiments, five from the United States and six from 
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other countries. The US research shows that salary incentives programs for teachers, 
also called payment by results, performance incentives or variable remuneration, have 
not influenced the performance levels of students in a consistent and meaningful way. 
On the various scales used by researchers to measure learning gains, the average 
effect ranges from just 0.02 to 0.06 standard deviations. In the US context, therefore, 
the argument in favour of monetary incentives is not proven.  
Outside of the United States, however, the research tells a different story. 
Studies meeting the meta-analysis criteria conducted in India and Israel, for example, 
show an average 0.08 s.d. impact. In the case of India, Muralidharan and  
Sundararaman (2009) conducted a two year experiment on the impact of a 3% salary 
bonus on the learning of mathematics and the mother tongue, granted either 
individually or collectively to teachers. The average gain was 0.19 s.d., but with 
extremes of 0.22 s.d. in Maths in the case of schools with individual teacher incentives 
and 0.15 s.d. in schools with collective incentives (Muralidharan and Sundararaman, 
2009). In the case of Israel, the incentives were paid to teachers of English and Maths 
in 49 high schools. There was a significant increase in both the number of students 
who passed the year and in average test scores, mainly of lower performing students. 
The average effect of the salary incentives on student scores was 0.12 s.d. (Lavy, 
2002; 2009). 
Incipient Brazilian research begins to show results that look similar to those of 
India and Israel. In São Paulo, researchers used a matching technique to create a 
control group composed of either municipal schools in São Paulo or state schools from 
elsewhere in the country and a “differences in differences” methodology to compare the 
control group with the state school treatment group. The matched, “shadow” schools, 
with the same observable characteristics as the São Paulo state schools, including 
Prova Brasil results from before the start of the bonus policy, showed lower results 
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after the introduction of the bonus policy. The authors found positive and significant 
gains for 4th grade results in the São Paulo state schools. On the national SAEB scale, 
the effect was equivalent to 6.4 points for Maths and 3.7 for Portuguese (Oshiro and 
Scorzafave, 2011). 
More recent research in the State of Pernambuco also shows positive results. 
To get round the problem of the lack of control group, Furtado (2015) also used a 
matching technique, based on propensity scores, to compare the performance of 
schools included in that state´s Educational Performance Bonus policy with municipal 
schools untouched by the policy. To this end, the research created 5th and 9th grade 
pairs of state and municipal schools from the State of Pernambuco that were equal on 
the municipal human development index, SES of pupils, total number of pupils and pre-
bonus (2008) performance in Maths and Portuguese. The results of the comparison are 
broken down by grade. In the 5th grade the bonus policy schools are shown to have a 
low but significant advantage for the early years of the policy, between 2008 and 2011, 
with an average gain of 4 points in comparison with the control group in Maths and 3 
points in Portuguese. The 9th grade results, on the other hand, show a consistent and 
significant advantage of, on average, 5 points for both Math and Portuguese for each of 
the periods studied (Furtado, 2015; 2016). However, the fact that the gains for the full 
period of the study (2008-2012) are the same as for the early period (2008-2010) leads 
to the conclusion that the bonus-induced performance improvement is not constant 
over time but a phenomenon concentrated in the first years of the policy, that permits 
the school to reach and then maintain a new level of attainment. 
Incidentally, the research was able to show that the increase in performance as 
measured by the Pernambuco state assessment system (SAEPE), used to determine 
whether the schools have reached their targets, is the same as the increase measured 
by the national SAEB tests that have no bearing on the bonus policy. This finding is 
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relevant insofar as it shows that SAEPE has not been subjected to inflationary 
pressures, brought on by the “gaming” sometimes provoked by high-stakes tests, and 
continues, therefore, a reliable measure of performance. The loss of reliability is a 
problem raised by a number of authors (Hout and Elliott, 2011) and has been used, in 
the Brazilian case, as a further argument for the abandonment of accountability policies 
(Freitas, 2013). 
 
8. OTHER SIDE-EFFECTS 
The Brazilian literature identifies a number of other possible side-effects of the 
bonus policy. These include the increase in undesirable competition between teachers 
and schools (Nogueira et al, 2013), a loss of teacher autonomy in the definition of 
curriculum objectives, an undue increase in pressure on teachers (Ximenes, 2012), the 
generalization of the myth of teacher irresponsibility (Ximenes, 2012) and the 
promotion of dishonesty and fraud (Movimento, 2010; CNE, 2012).  
Because of the tendency to assume a correspondence between the United 
States and Brazil in the forms and consequences of accountability, most criticisms that 
seek to sustain arguments regarding the side-effects of the policy have drawn on US 
literature. This is clear in the claim that accountability provokes undue competition. In 
the Brazilian case, the goals and the bonus payments are school-wide, paid on a 
collective basis and in accordance with levels of target attainment by the school. In this 
scenario, a school is effectively competing with its own past performance and any 
competition between schools and teachers would be unexpected and probably 
extraneous to the policy.  
The perceived loss of teacher autonomy in the definition of curriculum 
objectives also seems misplaced in the Brazilian context. For those who study 
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classroom practice, there is no memory of a golden era in which the teacher was able 
to express his or her competence and creativity in the choice of content or the 
construction of a curricular sequence. The curriculum, as taught, has rarely been the 
subject of individual teacher choice. Prior to the advent of tests and their matrices, 
curriculum guidelines were provided by the text book, supplied free for teacher and 
pupils by the Ministry. After the introduction of testing, and the more recent phase of 
“basic content” guidelines by states concerned to create an alignment between the 
curriculum and its assessment, such as São Paulo, Minas Gerais, Pernambuco, Ceará 
and Rio de Janeiro, teachers have had access for the first time to a common core. It 
has been argued that the definition of curricular content by year and subject and the 
correspondence between the curriculum and the tests in these states has finally made 
it possible for the authorities to explain and for teachers to understand the results of 
assessments (Brooke and Cunha, 2011). Considerably overdue, the state common 
cores and the progress in the definition of curricular expectations for each grade are 
steps in the right direction that, to some extent, can be attributed to both low and high-
stakes assessment systems having taken the lead.   
If the local research existed, other criticisms might also be proven inappropriate 




The fact that more than half of the Brazilian states have chosen not to use their 
test results for high-stakes accountability purposes does not sit well with the belief that 
this country is inevitably set to repeat the experience of the United States. This over-
mechanistic belief in the inexorable demands of capitalist development, that 
underestimates the importance of local history and culture in the decisions of 
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administrators to take or leave the use of salary incentives as a management tool, may 
even have contributed to the virulence of the opposition to the policy in Brazil on the 
grounds of the exaggerated use of all types of educational accountability in the US.  
The history of the adoption and rapid development of accountability in the US 
shows the existence of a logic concerning the supply and oversight of public services 
that is closely related to the American citizen´s identity as a taxpayer and the belief in 
the right to information regarding the correct and constructive use of all government 
funds. With the addition of middle-class parental pressure for good school results, deep 
confidence in the idea of individual merit and government conviction regarding the 
need for standards to drive educational improvements, US culture has been able to 
generate such a stifling education accountability environment as to provoke a popular 
revolt and the end of the NCLB legislation.   
The onset and development of high-stakes accountability in Brazil obeys a 
different logic. The use of pupil attainment to calculate salary incentives is first and 
foremost about gains in efficiency and employee productivity, in a reaction to 
demonstrably poor results and the absence of any alternative method to promote better 
performance among public sector employees. As evidence, it should be remembered 
that all the salary incentive policies are contingent on indicators of teacher 
assiduousness, including those states which do not include pupil performance criteria. 
This means that if the teacher is absent in excess of the annual limit for days off, he or 
she is not awarded the school-wide bonus. In this situation it is moot whether the salary 
incentive is a policy to promote gains in pupil performance or an attempt to reduce 
widespread teacher absence. Whichever the answer, it is clear that the policy has little 
to do with public information and transparency, the correct use of resources, the 
satisfaction of curriculum standards or the promotion of students.  
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In reality, the discussion should be more about the use and consequences of 
performance pay policies, as used in the private sector, than of accountability. Do they 
work in their sector of origin and are they likely to work in schools if the public sector 
doesn´t sell products for profit in a competitive market? A partial answer is supplied by 
Adams, Heywood and Rothstein (2009) who show that in the rare cases of collective 
bonuses in the US, the size of the group is a crucial factor and that in the case of small 
groups, the increase in collective productivity is generally the result of an improvement 
on the part of the least productive members. However, where the indicators of 
productivity are quantitative, as in the case of pupil results, the risk of their suffering 
distortion are considerable. Nevertheless, one of the study´s conclusions is that, 
depending on the circumstances, the positive benefits of performance pay can 
outweigh the negative side-effects:  
Several analyses by economists, management experts, and sociologists have 
concluded that narrowly quantitative incentive schemes have, at times, 
somewhat improved the average performance of medical care, job training, 
welfare, and private sector agents. The documentation of perverse 
consequences does not indicate that, in any particular case, the harm 
outweighed the benefits of such narrow quantitative accountability (Rothstein, 
2009, p.97).    
What the present article has argued is that given the enormous differences 
between the US and Brazil, including the social and cultural characteristics of that part 
of the population attended by public education and the way the population relates to 
government, there is actually little reason to imagine that the accountability policies of 
the two countries would be similar in their meaning and consequences. While in the US 
the accountability climate in schools is seen as multi-layered and often threatening, in 
Brazil the climate is described as tame and largely free of negative consequences, 
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given that the accountability policies are essentially an adaptation of private sector 
performance pay schemes. 
It is these differences that makes it problematic to imagine that Brazil will follow 
the same path as the US and inappropriate to use research from that country as 
evidence for the evaluation of Brazilian salary incentives to promote pupil performance 
gains. What, then, does the Brazilian research show? 
The evidence would seem to confirm that the nature and impact of Brazilian 
accountability policies are indeed the product of the local context and conditions. When 
the impacts of salary incentives are measured in terms of performance gains, Brazil 
behaves like other developing or middle-income countries rather than like the US. The 
gains are significant and if not a solution to Brazil´s educational problems, look 
potentially positive in cost-benefit terms. If the case of Pernambuco is an example, the 
average 5 point gain on the national SAEB scale would not be easy to achieve with 
other types of policy such as in-service teacher training. 
A possible explanation for the positive results, in contrast to the near zero 
scores in the US, is related to the recency of both performance targets and salary 
incentive policies and the fact that these policies are effectively alone in expressing the 
message of the importance of pupil results as a school objective and as a measure of 
school quality. In a more saturated accountability environment, this message is 
transmitted in numerous different ways, making it more difficult to show gains in 
relation to any specific accountability measure. In other words, where pupil results are 
used to determine school choice, school finance, school interventions, teacher 
evaluations and promotions etc. the likelihood of finding an association between salary 
incentives and performance is likely to be lower. 
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The research also makes it clear that there are significant differences in the 
operation of the incentive policies, making it difficult to assume they are all equally 
defective or likely to have equal impact. In other words, the design of the policies can 
be expected to affect their influence and consequences. This is especially important for 
the discussion of the side-effects of the incentive policies.  
The capacity of salary incentives to exacerbate inequality is the more worrying 
of the possible side-effects. It seems that incentive policies can contribute to between 
school inequality even when their design acts explicitly to inhibit discrimination or the 
movement of teachers by incorporating a measure of pupil SES or “school effort” in the 
fixing of school targets. This could be the result of the contribution of the salary bonus 
to the school´s prestige and subsequent illegal selection of pupils, but more research is 
needed. An increase in within school inequality on the other hand, due to teachers 
paying less attention to pupils with lower performance, is less likely to occur where the 
incentive policy is not based on pass marks or a single school average. Any growth in 
inequality of this type, even in cases where different performance levels have been 
incorporated, might be due to the wider tendency for the benefits of school quality 
improvement to accrue to pupils of higher SES, as shown by research demonstrating 
that the increase in the school average is generally accompanied by increasing 
inequality (Franco et al, 2007).  
Research on the effect of incentive policies on the curriculum has not shown the 
purely negative consequences foreseen by its critics nor that the quality of teaching is 
suffering unduly for this reason. The signs are that high-stakes assessments can be 
having a positive effect on the fulfilment of official curriculum objectives, on the level of 
collaboration between teachers, on the importance attributed to achieving school 
targets and even on the attention paid to adapting teaching practice to the needs of 
pupils. Where there is evidence of narrowing and “teaching to the test”, the discussion 
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as to how far these effects can be considered negative is far from conclusive. It is 
probable that some of the diversity has gone from the curriculum, as the price paid for 
the increase in performance by virtue of the acquisition of basic skills by a larger 
proportion of pupils. However, this conclusion is tentative and should be the subject of 
further research. 
What the research also says is that education policy-makers can no longer 
ignore a growing body of evidence regarding the differences between alternative salary 
bonus models and the probability of different impacts. The dispassionate appraisal of 
the policy must not only weigh the evidence regarding side-effects but also observe the 
relationship between these and the type of incentive scheme under consideration. If 
salary incentives are to be continued, as one amongst a number of policy options, their 
costs need to be calculated and compared to the benefits as measured by appropriate 
methods of public policy evaluation. 
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